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From union of tyrants to power to the people? 
The significance of the Pan-African Parliament for the African 
Union  
Klaas van Walraven 1 
 
Abstract 
 
This article analyses the significance of the newly established ‘Pan-African 
Parliament’. As one of the few genuinely new institutions of the ‘African 
Union’ (AU) – itself the successor of the ‘Organisation of African Unity’ 
(OAU) –, the Parliament’s birth could provide the institutional transforma-
tions that have taken place in continental politics with more concrete mean-
ing. After sketching the historical background to the idea of parliamentary 
representation in the (O)AU, the article outlines the African Union’s forma-
tion and how this interconnected with the notion of a parliamentary gather-
ing. It analyses in detail the Parliament’s Protocol, the structures and pow-
ers with which it was provided, and its formal relations with the other or-
gans of the Union. The article describes how the Parliament was formally 
launched in March 2004 and then gives an assessment of its possible im-
pacts on the institutions of the AU; on AU policy-making; and on the Un-
ion’s member states. Its potential role in the review mechanisms of the 
CSSDCA and NEPAD is also discussed. The article concludes that the Par-
liament’s influence will remain marginal for the foreseeable future.  
Keywords 
The African Union, Parliaments, Parliamentary functions, Parliamentary struc-
ture, International governmental organizations, Reforms 
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Introduction 
n 18 March 2004 the ‘Pan-African Parliament’ was formally inaugurated 
in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.2 The administration of the oath of 
office, election of its president and deliberations of its first session were her-
alded as a landmark in the institutional transformations taking place in Af-
rica’s continental structures of co-operation since the early 1990s. The Pan-
African Parliament was held up as one of the few genuinely new institutions 
added to the structures of continental co-operation of the ‘African Union’ 
(AU), which, under a new name, still partly represents a continuation of its 
predecessor, the ‘Organisation of African Unity’ (OAU). 
The Parliament’s inauguration follows on a decade of continual re-
form in Pan-African structures. Most of these reforms have been aimed at 
improving the handling of the continent’s many violent conflicts, as well as at 
providing a more effective answer to Africa’s continuous underdevelopment. 
Thus, in 1991 OAU member states adopted a treaty for an ‘African Economic 
Community’ (AEC) intended to boost continental economic integration. In 
1992 the OAU’s secretariat established a ‘Conflict Management Division’ de-
signed to improve the monitoring of (violent) political developments. One 
year later, the organisation introduced a ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution’ aimed at enhancing its response capacity vis-à-
vis conflicts.3 By improving the co-operation between the Secretary-General, 
the dynamic Tanzanian Salim Ahmed Salim, and the organisation’s supreme 
organ, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the OAU did super-
ficially ameliorate its record in conflict mediation. The Assembly’s Bureau 
regularly convened in emergency session to provide political back-up to the 
innumerable mediation efforts launched by the Secretary-General in conflicts, 
ranging from civil strife in the Great Lakes region, the Comoros and Mada-
gascar through to the dramatically ‘conventional’ war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. 
 However, this flurry of activity was, on the whole, marked by a reliance 
on time-honoured moderating tactics that proved impotent in conflicts of high 
intensity. Without effective continental leadership, the OAU continued to rely on 
the United Nations, and to acquiesce in the more robust forms of conflict inter-
vention of Africa’s sub-regional organisations. Amid seemingly enduring civil 
wars, the organisation’s chronic budget deficits and Africa’s consistent failure to 
catch up in the global economic rat race, soul-searching for more effective institu-
tional answers continued. Spurred on by Libya’s aspirations of staking out a 
                                                 
2  See the African Union’s website www.africa-union.org (accessed on 4 March 2004). 
3  See for discussion Wembou (1994); Matthies (1996); Edimo (1997). 
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more prominent role for itself in continental politics, and with the backing of 
some of its more important member states, the OAU in 1999 embarked on a 
wholesale transformation of its structures, culminating in the formal inaugura-
tion of the African Union in May 2001. 
In this transformation process, the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government was renamed the ‘Assembly’, the Council of Ministers became 
the ‘Executive Council’, and the secretariat was dubbed ‘the Commission’. 
The AU’s first ordinary session in Durban, South Africa transformed the As-
sembly’s Bureau, in recognition of its increased role in conflict mediation, into 
a ‘Peace and Security Council’ (2002).4 While granted powers in ‘peace sup-
port’ operations, this Council can only recommend to the Assembly – which 
retains overall institutional control – the possibility of interventions in mem-
ber states afflicted by war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.5 
 Other organs catered for in the plethora of the AU’s institutions, how-
ever, had already been planned a decade earlier, without any steps towards their 
realisation having been taken since: the AEC treaty of 1991 not only stipulated 
continental monetary union as a long-term objective, but also provided for the 
establishment of a ‘Court of Justice’ and a Pan-African Parliament. The heralding 
of the African Union therefore appeared to confirm the lack of progress achieved 
in the implementation of the AEC treaty, and met with sceptical comments from 
many observers. This scepticism was reinforced by the unrealistic nature of some 
of its ‘new’ policy objectives – like continental economic integration and the 
setting up of an ‘African Central Bank’ – and by the fact that, despite the change 
in names, old OAU organs appeared to some extent to be clothed in new institu-
tional jackets. 
Thus, the actual birth of the Pan-African Parliament could be inter-
preted as prima facie evidence that the OAU’s transformation into the African 
Union has now progressed beyond a mere renaming of institutions. Yet, the 
question to be answered here is whether the Pan-African Parliament is such a 
significant institutional development as it is made out to be by contemporary 
observers. What meaning does the Parliament have for the evolution of the 
African Union? Will it affect its functioning? What role could it play in the 
new structure? Will it change the nature of the African Union? This article 
seeks to provide some preliminary observations by sketching the historical 
                                                 
4  A protocol to this effect was adopted and ratified by a majority of member states. It en-
tered into force on 26 December 2003. List of Countries Which Have Signed, Rati-
fied/Acceded to the African Union Convention on Protocol Relating to the Establishment of 
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (as on 11 March 2004). 
5  Although it may institute sanctions against member states in case of an unconstitutional 
change of government. See art. 7.1.g of the protocol cited in the note above. The context of 
this article would presumably suggest that peace-support missions require the consent of the 
member state concerned. 
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background of the idea of parliamentary representation in the (O)AU; the 
structures and powers of the Parliament; its relations to the African Union 
and its other organs; and its potential roles both in the context of the AU and, 
externally, in that of the ‘peer review’ mechanisms launched under the ‘Con-
ference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa’ 
(CSSDCA) and the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (NEPAD). 
Here it is contended that, for the time being, the Parliament will only be able 
to marginally affect the AU’s internal power structures,  its policy-making 
processes and, through the above-mentioned peer reviews, the behaviour of 
member states. 
 
 
Historical background of the idea of parliamentary representation 
 
Parliaments are the symbol of ‘democracy’. They are held to stand for the 
influence of ‘the people’ on the way they are governed. This is true for par-
liaments operating at the national level and for parliaments that are part of 
international organisations. The fact that the OAU never provided for a par-
liamentary body was, in this respect, not coincidental. It underlined the extent 
to which the organisation represented an organisation that catered almost 
exclusively to the interests of Africa’s state elites – often to the detriment of 
the majority of the unprivileged and powerless. The OAU’s structures were 
therefore highly étatiste, precluding formal representation of popular interests, 
while organs not composed of state representatives were few and lacked 
clout. From the beginning, the voice of domestic opposition elements was 
effectively silenced. Policies were geared to an institutional desire to uphold 
the power of the continent’s political leaderships. The mediation of inter-state 
conflicts was, for example, affected by a propensity to limit the potential in-
jury they could cause to the interests and self-esteem of state elites. Intra-state 
strife was declared out of bounds and the bias towards state elite interests led 
to a grotesque disregard for developments inside member states. Hence, Afri-
cans outside the corridors of power developed very negative ideas about the 
Pan-African body, one of the most popular perceptions referring to the OAU 
as a trade union of tyrants. From the late 1970s, opposition interests in mem-
ber states therefore began to plead for the organisation’s transformation into a 
‘peoples’ OAU’ – an idea that remained inarticulate, but stood for a degree of 
‘popular’ representation inside the Pan-African institution.6 
 By the early 1990s these aspirations were fully unleashed at the na-
tional level, finding conceptual expression in the struggle for multi-partyism, 
                                                 
 6  Van Walraven (1999): ch. 8. 
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‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ in the OAU’s member states themselvers.. 
As member states could no longer afford to ignore their domestic audiences, 
so the OAU was also forced to show that it catered to more than government 
elites alone. One way of doing this was by adoption of the AEC treaty in 1991, 
which provided, on paper, the first opportunity for the representation of par-
liamentary interests inside the OAU. Yet, while the treaty entered into force 
shortly after,7 the realisation of the parliamentary body was slow in coming. 
In retrospect, what was important was that the AEC treaty stipulated that a 
Pan-African Parliament be put on the rolls, although seemingly limiting its 
role to involvement in the continent’s ‘economic development and integra-
tion’ and postponing its beginning until a Protocol had defined its composi-
tion, functions and powers.8 
The inter-governmental lip service now paid to the idea of parlia-
mentary representation should be seen in the wider context of increased OAU 
concern, in the 1990s, with interests and groups other than governments. Yet 
this newly professed sympathy for non-governmental, ‘popular’ and even 
‘grass roots’ interests, notably by the OAU’s secretariat officials, should not 
simply be equated with pleas for parliamentary representation at the Pan-
African level. The roles and interests of  ‘popular’ or non-governmental 
groupings may not be identical to those of (national or continental) parlia-
mentarians. As shown below, NGOs gained other forms of representation 
inside the African Union and their role – which would warrant a separate 
analysis outside the scope of this article – should not be confused with the 
institutional function of a parliamentary body. Yet the new OAU concern 
with non-governmental questions did help set the stage for a reform process, 
in which the idea of a permanent body to monitor, criticise and discuss with 
the purely inter-governmental organs of the Pan-African organisation could 
gain more credence. 
Thus it was especially the OAU’s Secretary-General who tried to en-
courage change in the role that the organisation played in Africa’s political 
order. His visions reflected the critiques that non-governmental groupings 
had levelled against the OAU in the past.9 He was seen visiting refugee 
camps, talking to the disenfranchised and even inviting those claiming to be 
their spokesmen to headquarters. For example, in 1996 the OAU secretariat 
organised a conference at which numerous non-governmental groupings with 
                                                 
7  1994. By July 2003 it had been signed by all member states except Eritrea, with only six 
member states that had not ratified it. EX/CL/36 (III): Report of the Interim Chairperson of 
the Commission on the Status of AU Treaties, Maputo, 4-8 July 2003: 13. 
8  Article 14, sections 1-2 AEC Treaty. 
9  See, for example, ‘OAU at 30: Reflections on the Past and Prospects for the Future: Ad-
dress by the Secretary-General, H.E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim on the occasion of the 30th 
Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity’, Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, May 25, 1993. 
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roots in what was called ‘civil society’ were represented: they were allowed to 
freely criticise the role of state elites in their presence, intervene in plenary 
debates and articulate their ideas. Whatever the merits of these views, they 
constituted a radical departure from a past propensity to cover painful sub-
jects with a deafening silence.10 
This development was not just carried by the organisation’s secre-
tariat staff – who could be held to have an institutional interest in expanding 
the organisation’s agenda –, but also by Western donors and some of the 
OAU’s more ‘enlightened’ member states.11 It interlocked, in this respect, with 
initiatives taken by member states wishing to contribute towards a new conti-
nental order from an inter-governmental angle, such as the ‘Kampala Forum’ 
(1991). This forum planned to establish a semi-permanent Conference on Se-
curity, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) that 
would encourage political pluralism, limited tenures of political leaders, free 
and fair elections and regular monitoring of human rights records. Analogous 
to the Helsinki processes in Eastern Europe, this could indirectly help 
strengthen the weight of non-governmental (if not parliamentary) interests by 
providing them with the documentary sticks with which to censure deviant 
regimes. Yet its implementation was still firmly set in the (post-) governmen-
tal sphere, inter alia through elder statesmen or ‘eminent personalities’.12 
The evolution of the CSSDCA was, moreover, rather slow13 and only 
received a new boost with the transformation of the OAU into the African 
Union and the birth of another initiative  – NEPAD (see below). What was, 
perhaps, the most important aspect of the CSSDCA initiative was the lip ser-
vice it paid to the idea of periodic reviews of government records as such. 
These reviews were, however, to be executed by peers, i.e. fellow government 
officials (ministers, heads of state, diplomats) rather than by parliamentary 
representatives. In this sense they were at odds with the decision, in the AEC 
treaty, to work towards parliamentary representation in the OAU, while they 
would not provide a permanent outlet for criticism. This is further discussed 
below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10  The author was present at this conference. Comparable conferences were held in 2001 
and 2002. 
11  Senegal springs to mind here. 
12  Draft Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development 
and Co-operation in Africa’, II.B & III.D. 
13  Kornegay (2000): 22. 
 
From ‘Union of Tyrants’ to ‘Power to the People’? 
 
 
203
 
The African Union 
 
To some extent the adoption of the AEC provisions on a Pan-African Parlia-
ment conformed to standard OAU practice to procrastinate in case of lack of 
agreement among member states. An idea as such could be lauded in non-
committal principle, whilst postponing implementation until such time as its 
necessary specification had been ruled in procedural arrangements never to 
be endorsed.14 Implementation of the AEC treaty, however, was scheduled to 
take place gradually over a transitional period not exceeding 34 years, with 
the setting up of the Pan-African Parliament and election of its members to be 
realised during the sixth and final stage.15 Yet, in the different context of the 
1990s, the idea for a continental parliament assumed some urgency and, by 
the end of the decade, became interlocked with the negotiations on the OAU’s 
transformation into the African Union. 
As much has already been written on the establishment of the AU,16 
here we focus on some of its underlying ideas and how these interconnected 
with the notion of the Pan-African Parliament. Like the Charter of the OAU, 
the African Union’s ‘Constitutive Act’ was the product of a compromise. The 
Assembly’s decision to convene an extraordinary summit in September 1999 
was taken in order to discuss ‘ways and means of making the OAU effective 
so as to keep pace with political and economic developments taking place in 
the world and the preparation required of Africa within the context of global-
ization’.17 
While these considerations betrayed some of the member states’ 
long-term concerns, much of the input for the Union came from the Libyan 
leader Qaddafi, who managed to persuade member states to accept the Lib-
yan town of Sirte as venue. Engaging in surprise tactics, the Libyans sprang a 
fully fledged draft ‘founding treaty’ for an ‘African Union’ upon the summit, 
which had not circulated before and was at considerable variance with a pre-
paratory declaration of the OAU’s own secretariat. Predictably, this fuelled 
suspicions among heads of state about Libya’s intentions and produced a 
deadlock that could only be broken by consultations among certain key coun-
tries. South Africa, Nigeria, but also Egypt and Mali, besides Libya, actively 
engaged to affect the outcome of these negotiations. Of these, Egypt and Ni-
geria had traditionally rivalled with the Libyan leader and tried to restrict his 
presence north and south of the Sahara – of which countries like Mali were 
                                                 
14  Rapid ratification of treaties has, in this respect, never been prima facie evidence of politi-
cal commitment. See Bula-Bula (2002): 67 and Van Walraven (1999): ch. 5. 
15  Art. 6.2.f.iv AEC Treaty. Also, Mathews (2001): 115 and Genge (2000): 2-3. 
16  See Meyns (2001) and sources cited elsewhere in this article.  
17  AHG/Dec.140 (XXXV). 
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potential victims. In contrast, South Africa’s government entertained cordial 
relations with Qaddafi in gratitude for his support for the ANC’s struggle 
against Apartheid. South Africa and Nigeria were both claimants to hege-
monic status in sub-Saharan Africa, the one pushing its somewhat inarticulate 
idea of an ‘African Renaissance’, and the other in the forefront of the 
CSSDCA. Both countries were to prove crucial to canvass support for an ‘Af-
rican Union’ among several of the doubters, such as Botswana, Kenya and 
Uganda.18 The deadlocked negotiations led to a decision to order a small con-
sultative group at ministerial level to produce a synthesis of the different 
ideas – the ‘Sirte Declaration’ subsequently adopted by the Assembly. 
The influence of Qaddafi’s typically grand vision and revolutionary 
rhetoric was unmistakable in the Declaration’s language and provisions. For 
instance, it stipulated that ‘an African Union’ be established, the implementa-
tion of the AEC treaty speeded up and the organs of the AEC established 
forthwith, ‘in particular, the Pan-African Parliament’ which should be formed 
‘by the year 2000, to provide a common platform for our peoples and their 
grass-root organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-
making’.19 While reference to the Parliament was strictly made in the context 
of the AEC treaty, which drew part of its inspiration from the example of 
European integration, it also conformed to Qaddafi’s long-established revolu-
tionary lip service to popular, if not genuinely grass-roots’, representation.20 
Yet the Sirte Declaration was also the outcome of the moderating in-
fluence of other member states, as it referred the Union’s formation to the 
Council of Ministers, which should supervise the preparation of a legal text 
that took into account the OAU and AEC charters. Neither the Declaration 
nor the subsequent Constitutive Act establishing the AU made any provision 
for a supra-national structure. In the same vein as Kwame Nkrumah had 
more or less united African states in 1963 against his idea of ‘Union Govern-
ment’, neutralising his proposals in the OAU Charter, so Qaddafi’s grand 
vision was to be safely embedded in the inter-governmental arrangements of 
the Constitutive Act. But what should be noted here is that, from the very 
outset, the OAU’s transformation into the African Union was closely linked to 
the establishment of a Pan-African Parliament. Its Protocol, which will be 
discussed in the next section, was to be drafted simultaneously with the AU’s 
founding document. In a way this was a logical step, since if the African Un-
ion was to differ from its predecessor, it was by adding an institution that had 
                                                 
18 Maluwa (2002) and Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series) (1999): 
13678. 
19 Sirte Declaration, 8.ii.b. 
20 The original Libyan proposal thus contained provision for an ‘African Congress’. Also see 
Vandewalle (1995) and Bula-Bula (2002): 71-72. 
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been absent from the OAU, preferably one with the function to represent 
interests other than those of member governments.21 
 The politicking that ensued after the Sirte summit centred around 
various issues – notably the exact relationship between the AEC, OAU, AU, 
and around parliamentary provisions still contentious at the time. Neverthe-
less, these negotiations quite rapidly led to the adoption of both the Constitu-
tive Act and the ‘Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament’. The OAU’s secretariat 
engaged a group of consultants to assist in the formulation of two draft texts; 
legal experts and parliamentarians convened twice, in Addis Ababa and in 
the Libyan capital Tripoli, in April-May 2000, to discuss the drafts; and a min-
isterial conference immediately following on the Tripoli meeting adopted a 
draft Constitutive Act, which was then adopted by the Council of Ministers 
and Assembly of Heads of State and Government that convened in Lomé in 
July. Adoption of the Protocol for the Pan-African Parliament had to wait 
until March 2001, when member states assembled in Sirte for a second time 
for the formal launching of the Union.22 
 Although the process leading to the adoption of the Constitutive Act 
was very much an affair of governmental actors, several of its clauses have a 
direct or indirect bearing on the idea of parliamentary as well as non-
governmental or popular representation in and outside the continental or-
ganisation. Thus, besides the Parliament itself, the African Union was to have 
an ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Council’ (ECOSOCC), to be composed of 
‘different social and professional groups’ (art. 22.1). The AU’s central objec-
tives and principles contained important new political values, to which mem-
ber states now explicitly committed themselves. The Act claimed, in its pre-
amble, to be inspired by the ‘need to build a partnership between govern-
ments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the 
private sector’. It stated a determination ‘to promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and … ensure 
good governance and the rule of law’. Some of the substantive provisions 
listed, among the AU’s objectives and principles, the promotion of and re-
spect for democratic principles and institutions, human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance, social justice, gender equality and the sanctity of hu-
man life; the rejection of impunity and unconstitutional changes of govern-
ments; the Union’s right, subject to Assembly approval, to intervene in mem-
                                                 
21 In this vein Mathews (2001): 119. 
22 See AHG/Decl.143 (XXXVI). Technically, the Constitutive Act entered into force in May 
2001, after the deposit of the required number of ratifications. EX/CL/36 (III): Report of the 
Interim Chairperson of the Commission on the Status of AU Treaties, Maputo, 4-8 July 2003, 
18. See for the inevitable politicking during this period Genge (2000): 3-6 and Maluwa (2002): 
20-21. 
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ber states in case of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; and 
the ‘participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union’ (arts. 3-
4). Only this last provision catered directly for the notion of popular involve-
ment inside the Union itself, specified further in the sections devoted to the 
Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council. But the provisions 
on democratic government inside member states themselves could hardly be 
seen as distinct from this, as it is these that set the tone for the AU’s commit-
ment to the (in)direct representation of popular interests in Africa’s govern-
ance. 
The presence of the above political commitments was certainly a re-
markable break with the OAU’s past. Yet there seems to be no reason for un-
reserved optimism, neither from the perspective of the Constitutive Act nor 
on the grounds of subsequent political practice. For the Act’s compromise 
character also led to the inclusion of time-honoured clauses on the defence of 
national sovereignty, the respect for colonial frontiers and the prohibition of 
interference ‘by any Member State in the internal affairs of another’ (art. 4) – 
without making clear how these provisions were to be balanced with the Un-
ion’s commitment to democratic governance in member states and its stand 
on possible steps against deviant regimes. Moreover, the imposition of sanc-
tions was stipulated as the preserve of the Assembly or the Peace and Security 
Council, which are made up of fellow heads of state or their subordinates.23 
Of course, the non-intervention principle figures in many international 
institutions and can in part be regarded as the basis of the limited degree of ‘or-
der’ that obtains in international relations. Yet the (O)AU’s unfavourable past in 
this respect gave cause for scepticism. Predictably, political practice was to prove 
more ambiguous than the statement of principle. The deviation from proper 
democratic procedure in Zimbabwe during the elections of 2000/2002, to men-
tion only the more blatant example, at best triggered reticent responses from 
among member states, some of which appeared willing to come to the defence of 
a fellow member country under attack from the West.24 Suffice it to say that this 
hardly augured well for the implementation of the Union’s new norms and prin-
ciples, while it underscored the compromise character of the AU’s novel institu-
tions. The hybrid nature of their origins, ranging from Libyan revolutionary 
rhetoric, the long-established predilection of African leaders for inter-
governmental structures, through to an astonishing lip service to the discourse of 
                                                 
23 Art. 23.2 Constitutive Act & art. 7.1. e & g Protocol Peace and Security Council. 
24 For astonishing AU responses, see Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural 
Series) (2002): 14758 and 14768. 
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European integration,25 could, then, conceal an absence of firm commitment to a 
genuinely new continental set-up. 
 
 
The parliament’s protocol 
 
The process of drafting a constitutive Protocol for the Parliament had to over-
come numerous problems. What should be the actual functions and prerogatives 
of the parliamentarians vis-à-vis other organs of the Union, in particular the 
Executive Council and Assembly? Should they have, in this respect, supra-
national powers? Should the Parliament be composed by direct elections in 
member states, like its European counterpart? Should representation be ar-
ranged on a national basis and, if so, how many persons should represent each 
country? Should the size of delegations be the same or differ according to popu-
lation?26 
 The Protocol declared that the Parliament’s formation was informed by 
‘a vision to provide a common platform for African peoples and their grass-roots 
organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the 
problems and challenges facing the Continent’ (preamble). Textually, this wid-
ened the Parliament’s role beyond what was stipulated in the Constitutive Act, 
which reiterated the AEC treaty formulation that the Parliament should ensure 
popular participation in ‘development and economic integration’ (art. 17.1). This 
was confirmed by the Protocol’s formal objectives, which provide for a much 
broader role: the facilitating of AU policies; the promotion of human rights, de-
mocracy, peace, stability, self-reliance and economic recovery; encouragement of 
good governance in member states; familiarising African peoples with the AU; 
facilitating co-operation between the parliamentary fora of regional economic 
communities; and the strengthening of continental solidarity (art. 3). 
 From this listing it becomes apparent, however, that the Parliament’s 
objectives are deliberative and external, i.e. oriented outward. Its brief allows it to 
discuss the broad range of political, economic, social, military or others issues 
with which Africa is confronted, rather than to affect the internal-institutional 
functioning of the Union as such. For instance, article 2 of the Protocol stipulates 
that, while the Parliament shall ultimately evolve into an institution ‘with full 
legislative powers’, it will have ‘consultative and advisory powers only’ until 
decided otherwise by an amendment to the Protocol. This limitation reflected 
disagreement among member states about the Parliament’s powers during the 
                                                 
25 This is obvious in the names of organs such as the ‘Commission’, the ‘Court of Justice’, 
and the Parliament itself, while the introduction of the completely novel ‘Permanent Repre-
sentatives Committee’ (art. 21) is  the clearest example of EU inspiration. 
26 Genge (2000): 9-11. 
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drafting stage, and it is confirmed by article 11 of the Protocol, which states that 
the Parliament ‘shall be vested with legislative powers to be defined by the As-
sembly’, but that ‘during the first term of its existence’ its prerogatives will be in 
the area of advice and consultation. Consequently, the catalogue of its formal 
functions allows the Parliament to ‘examine’, ‘discuss’ or ‘recommend’ – of its 
own accord or at the request of AU policy organs – on matters that, ‘inter alia’, 
relate to human rights, good governance and democracy. In addition, it is enti-
tled to work towards harmonisation of member state legislation; contribute to 
the attainment of AU objectives; and promote AU policies and their harmonisa-
tion with that of regional organisations (art. 11). 
 These ‘powers’ are essentially external: they relate to what is happening 
in member states or outside bodies, not to the internal functioning of the Union 
and its organs. Arguably, what makes for a real parliament are control of the 
budget and supervision of the executive. Yet the Protocol’s provisions carefully 
avoid conferment of such privileges. The Pan-African Parliament may adopt its 
own rules of procedure, establish the committees it deems fit, and elect its own 
chairperson. By contrast, it may only ‘request’ ‘officials’ of the Union to attend its 
sessions, ‘discuss’ its own budget and that of the Union as a whole and, rather 
surprisingly, only conclude its deliberations with ‘decisions’ taken by consensus 
or by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting (arts. 11.2, 5 & 8 and 
12.13).27 The above officials refer to the AU’s secretariat staff, not to the heads of 
state or government ministers making up the policy-making Assembly and Ex-
ecutive Council. The fact that the Parliament must act on consensus or with sub-
stantial majorities may detract from its potential institutional authority and re-
solve, and may risk watering down its resolutions to the insipid ritual that ob-
tained during the OAU era. 
From the perspective of the present Protocol, any concrete supervisory 
role over other AU organs has therefore been ruled out. Moreover, although the 
Parliament will draw up its own budget requirements, these must be endorsed 
by the Assembly ‘until such time as the Pan-African Parliament shall start to 
exercise legislative powers’. Its funds will be an integral part of the Union’s 
‘regular’ (but debt-ridden) budget (art. 15). This could act as a restraint on the 
Parliament’s necessary institutional evolution, the more so as MPs must be paid 
an allowance to meet expenses in the discharge of their duties (art. 10). In com-
pensation, the Protocol only allows the Parliament to appoint a ‘Clerk, two Dep-
uty Clerks and such other staff and functionaries as it may deem necessary for 
the proper discharge of its functions’, subject to approval by Assembly and 
                                                 
27 With the exception of procedural matters, for which simple majorities suffice. See art. 
12.12 Protocol. 
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Council of the size of the support staff. The Union’s Commission must render 
secretarial services to it on a provisional basis (arts. 11.8, 12.6 & 12.14). 
The stature and potential authority of the Parliament are, of course, 
closely bound up with its composition. Here, too, compromises were made that 
reflected opposition from certain member states to the attribution of autonomous 
standing to an assembly representing interests beyond the confines of govern-
mental circles. Thus, on the one hand the Protocol stipulates that the Parliamen-
tarians ‘shall represent all the peoples of Africa’, rather than their respective 
countries of origin, with the proviso that, ultimately, they will be ‘elected by 
universal adult suffrage’ (arts. 2.2 & 2.3). This suggests the eventual possibility of 
direct elections along the lines of the European Parliament. In the meantime, 
however, article 5 specifies that the Parliamentarians shall ‘be elected or desig-
nated by the respective National Parliaments or any other deliberative organs of 
the Member States, from among their members’. Moreover, their terms run con-
currently with their terms  in the respective national assemblies, which means 
that someone will cease to be a Pan-African MP if he or she ceases to be a mem-
ber of the national parliament. Worse, a Pan-African Parliamentarian loses 
his/her position if ‘recalled by the National Parliament or other deliberative 
organ’ (arts. 5.3 & 5.4). Although the members of the European Parliament were 
initially also designated by their national assemblies, this transforms the Pan-
African MPs into representatives of member state parliaments, notwithstanding 
the provision that they vote ‘in their personal and independent capacity’ (art. 6). 
This is confirmed by further provisions to the effect that it is member states that 
shall be represented in the Parliament and that national delegations, besides 
including at least one woman, shall reflect the diversity of opinions present in 
the assemblies of member states (art. 4).28 Membership of the Pan-African Par-
liament was, however, declared incompatible with national executive or judicial 
functions, thereby preventing the Parliament’s transformation into a purely 
governmental body (art. 7). Also, the MPs were awarded the parliamentary 
immunities necessary for the proper exercise of their function (arts. 8 & 9). 
 The choice for an indirect way of composing the Parliament’s ranks was 
not only informed by governmental jealousies. It was, not unreasonably, felt by 
some that direct election of Pan-African Parliamentarians would pose an enor-
mous administrative obstacle for countries that have just barely begun to learn 
how to manage electoral processes at the national level.29 Another contentious 
issue was the question whether all member states should have the same number 
of delegates. Nigeria, especially, argued that the size of national delegations 
                                                 
28 Election of the Parliament’s 4 Vice-Presidents must reflect representation of Africa’s 
different regions. Art. 12.2 Protocol. 
29 Genge (2000): 9. 
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should be determined or informed by the size of the national population.30 Yet in 
the end it was decided that each member state would get an equal number of 
MPs, i.e. five – regardless of population (arts. 4.1 & 4.2). That Nigeria’s demand 
was squarely rejected is typical of the political culture underlying Africa’s conti-
nental politics, which has always rejected formal inequality between member 
states and aspirations to hegemonic status.31 In the context of the Pan-African 
Parliament this means, however, that some peoples are, indirectly, grossly un-
der-represented whilst several others are seriously over-represented.32 
 
 
The Pan-African Parliament comes into being 
 
The Protocol quickly received the required number of national ratifications. At 
the Durban summit in 2002, the Assembly established a Steering Committee to 
speed up the implementation process, for which a meeting of African parlia-
ments was convened in Cape Town the next year.33 In November 2003, the AU 
Commission registered the deposit of the instrument of ratification by Senegal, 
which realised the requisite simple majority of member states and, after one 
month, led to the entry into force of the Protocol.34 In December, the Steering 
Committee, made up of the parliamentary speakers of ten countries chaired by 
South Africa, convened to discuss the modalities of the Parliament’s launching, 
scheduled for January 2004 but postponed until March. National parliaments 
were requested to nominate the members to be part of the Pan-African Parlia-
ment before 10 February.35 By mid February, 22 countries had done so and the 
Steering Committee issued rules for the oath of office to be administered, the 
Credentials Committee and the election of the President and Vice-Presidents, 
while adopting a provisional programme for the Parliament’s first session and 
deciding on some logistical matters.36 
                                                 
30 CM/Rpt (LXXIII) Report of the 73rd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, Tripoli, 
22-26 February 2001, 102-109 and Meyns (2001): 62. 
31 Van Walraven (1999). 
32 For an academic discussion of this, see Rule (2000). 
33 Assembly/AU/Dec.17 (II). 
34 Press Release No. 093/2003, Addis Ababa, 14 November 2003 and  art. 22 Protocol. By 
February 2004 at least forty of the 53 member states had deposited instruments of ratifica-
tion. See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Union 
Convention on Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relat-
ing to the Pan-African Parliament, dated ca. February-March 2004. 
35 Communiqué on the Proceedings of the Steering Committee on the Protocol Relating to 
Pan-African Parliament, Addis Ababa, 9 December 2003. 
36 Ibid., 14 February 2003 and Press Release No. 10/2004, Addis Ababa, 14 February 2004. 
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On 18 March 2004, amid some pomp and circumstance, the chairman of the 
AU’s Assembly, President Chissano of Mozambique, opened the Parliament’s 
inaugural session in the presence of invited representatives of ‘civil society’, 
including youth, women and religious groups. As required by the Protocol, he 
supervised the election of the Parliament’s four Vice-Presidents and President 
(art. 14.1). Amid some confusion about the proper procedure to be followed, 
MPs elected, with an overwhelming majority, Gertrude Mongela, a veteran 
woman politician and ambassador from Tanzania, as chairperson of the Parlia-
ment.37 The four Vice-Presidents chosen reflected the other four continental re-
gions, and a provisional total of 202 MPs from 41 member states were sworn in.38 
The occasion was marked by optimistic speeching, in which stress was laid on 
issues like the implementation of NEPAD and a potential role for the Parliament 
in the latter’s peer review mechanism (see below). The press hoped that opposi-
tion parties would be given space in continental politics and be able to form 
alliances across Africa.39 
 The Parliament is allowed by the Protocol to convene in ordinary ses-
sion ‘at least twice a year’, in the territory of any member state party to the Pro-
tocol or at headquarters.40 Although this stipulation suggests that it might con-
vene additional ordinary sessions, this is probably not the case, as the Protocol 
provides specifically for extraordinary meetings. Such special sessions, which 
may only discuss the matters for which they are convened, may be requested by 
Parliamentarians, who, however, need for this the concurrence of two-thirds of 
the members.41 As this constitutes a rather high threshold and there are clear 
financial limitations to its summoning – especially in the form of travel expenses 
for up to 260 MPs42 –, the Parliament may not become a semi-permanent body 
that could respond swiftly to sudden developments. This should be set against 
                                                 
37 ‘African Union Puts Women First Once Again’, www.allAfrica.com, 18 March 2004 (this 
and following sources accessed 22 March 2004). 
38 Southern Africa: Professor José Dias Van-Du’Nem (Angola; 1st Vice-President); North 
Africa: Dr. Mohammed Lutfi Farahat (Libya; 2nd Vice-President); Central Africa: Mrs 
Ne’loumsei Elise (Chad; 3rd Vice-President); West Africa: Jerome Sacca Kina Guezere (Benin; 
4th Vice-President). ‘BuaNews (Pretoria)’, www.allAfrica.com, 19 March 2004 & Press Re-
lease No. 019/2004, Addis Ababa, 19 March 2004. 
39 Ibid., 18 March 2004 and Business Day (Johannesburg), www.allAfrica.com, 18 March 2004. 
40 It may also convene joint sessions with national parliaments and the parliamentary as-
semblies of the continent’s regional communities (arts. 16 & 18). Selection of its permanent 
seat was the Assembly’s prerogative to be decided at its session in July 2004. After the with-
drawal of Libya, South Africa remained as main contender to host the Parliament, though 
still challenged by Egypt. Sunday Times (Johannesburg), www.allAfrica.com, 21 March 2004. 
41 It may also be convened by two-thirds of the members of the Council or Assembly. Art. 
14.3 Protocol. 
42 With 53 member states and five parliamentarians per country, the total size of the Parlia-
ment is 265. 
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the maximum length that it may remain in ordinary session, which is anything 
up to one month, allowing a broad exercise of its deliberative mandate (art. 14). 
 
 
A parliament on probation  
 
At its inception, the African Union’s Commission proudly claimed that the Par-
liament would in future be elected by direct universal suffrage and evolve into 
an institution with full legislative powers that would even override national 
legislation. It was suggested that it would only act as a consultative body during 
the first five years, which the Commission claimed was an ‘experimental pe-
riod’.43  
Much of this, however, was based on an optimistic reading of the Par-
liament’s Protocol and future. Firstly, whether or not member states will later 
agree on granting the Parliament ‘full legislative powers’, there is nothing to 
suggest that these would actually prevail over national legislation. While Africa’s 
continental structures are definitely undergoing a process of modification, the 
current political context would require considerable evolution before such a 
reform would stand a chance of acceptance. Secondly, article 25 of the Protocol 
stipulates only that, after five years, a conference of signatory states will be held 
to review its operation and effectiveness, with a view to ensuring that its objec-
tives are realised and the Protocol meets the ‘evolving needs’ of the African con-
tinent.44 Although article 11 states that, during its first term (presumably of five 
years), the Parliament will exercise advisory powers only, this does not mean 
that the review conference scheduled for 2009 will ipso facto  provide it with the 
legislative clout some people are craving for. This is legally possible, but not 
obligatory.45 In other words, the Parliament has been subjected to an unlimited 
spell of probation. The same is true for the prospect of direct elections, for which 
legal provision at an unspecified date has been made, but which may in practice 
be confronted with a lack of political will or insurmountable obstacles of a finan-
cial or logistical nature. 
  Under its current dispensation, the Parliament’s role and effectiveness 
are likely to be limited. However, in order to more precisely assess its potential 
impacts on African politics, one should distinguish between 1) the Parliament’s 
                                                 
43 AU spokesman to the UN IRIN network (www.allAfrica.com, accessed 19 November 
2003) and Press Release No. 093/2003, Addis Ababa, 14 November 2003. 
44 Further review conferences may be held at ten years’ intervals or less thereafter, if so 
decided by the Parliament (art. 25.2). 
45 See in this respect also article 2.3 Protocol: ‘until such time as the Member States decide 
otherwise … [the] Pan-African Parliament shall have consultative and advisory powers 
only’. 
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influence on the institutions of the AU itself and their functioning; 2) its effects 
on AU policy-making; and 3) the Parliament’s influence on the Union’s member 
states and their behaviour. 
 
1. The Parliament’s influence on the overall functioning of the AU is constricted 
by its procedural provisions, its own as well as the Union’s general budget con-
straints, and by its limited concrete powers vis-à-vis other organs. As noted 
above, the Parliament is only a semi-permanent organ that convenes twice a year 
– the likelihood of additional, extraordinary sessions sharply reduced by the 
cumbersome requirement of concurrence from two-thirds of its membership. 
Related travel expenses limit the Parliament’s speedy summoning even further. 
Indeed, in the ongoing process of the Union’s institutional transformation, com-
plaints have already been aired about the tendency of member states to decide 
positively about the establishment of ever more new institutions, without pon-
dering about the requisite financial means. As the Parliament is not allowed to 
raise funds itself, and as its budget is part of the Union’s debt-ridden regular 
funding, this poses a definite financial constraint on the Parliament’s institu-
tional evolution. In practice, this would only leave the alternative of donor assis-
tance, but it is difficult to imagine that donors would be prepared to contribute 
to the Union’s core funding. 
 The development of a personnel base necessary to facilitate plenary 
sessions, Parliamentary committees and general functioning will therefore 
probably remain cumbersome. This leaves the Parliament in a disadvantaged 
position vis-à-vis the Union’s only permanent organ, the Commission. Under the 
above circumstances the Commission, although itself usually suffering from 
budget and personnel constraints, is more likely to be better prepared and better 
able to respond to issues than the Parliament. The latter’s inability to convene 
speedily also limits any potential monitoring of the Peace and Security Council, 
which plays a key role in the mediation of Africa’s violent conflicts and is able to 
meet at short notice. 
 By contrast, the Parliament could strengthen its institutional position by 
collaborating with the Union’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council, 
ECOSOCC, catered for in the Constitutive Act. As mentioned above, this council 
is to be composed of ‘different social and professional groups’, for the purpose of 
which the AU Commission has been engaging in consultations with ‘civil society 
organisations’ in order to draw up the organ’s statutes. As an advisory organ 
focusing on social, economic and cultural issues, it is the Parliament’s natural 
partner to reinforce the non-governmental – if not civil society’s – dimension of 
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the Union.46 More generally, however, the lack of tangible internal powers – 
including control of the Union’s budget – makes it difficult for the Parliament to 
impose its will on other organs. Thus, there is no obligation for members of the 
Commission to appear before Parliament, although in practice they have an 
institutional interest to promote its evolution and will, hence, be likely to re-
spond positively to its invitations. Consequently, there are potentialities for fruit-
ful collaboration with both ECOSOCC and the Commission. 
 
2. However, this may not be so self-evident in the case of the most powerful 
institutions of the Union, the inter-governmental Assembly and Executive Coun-
cil. Since these are the Union’s key policy-making organs, the Parliament’s influ-
ence on AU policy-making can only be indirect and will probably remain limited 
for the foreseeable future. Its broad deliberative powers form its most important 
tool. They could be used, under the cover of advice and consultation, to inter-
vene in any internal Union matter – including the policies pursued and decisions 
taken by the Assembly and Council –, short of effecting decisions itself. The 
concrete utility of these deliberative prerogatives is limited by the Parliament’s 
obligation to ‘decide’ by consensus or by  a two-thirds majority. Consequently, 
there is a danger that it might copy the interminable speeching of the Assembly 
and Council, without tangibly advancing the policy-making process. Much de-
pends here on the diplomatic abilities of the Parliament’s Presidency. Its firm 
guidance is also required to prevent the zero-sum politicking known from the 
Parliament’s national counterparts, in addition to the actual realisation of the 
professed willingness by member states to listen to criticism and to engage in 
dialogue. In this context, the provision that Parliamentary proceedings will be 
open to the public47 – and so, by extension, to the media – could have both posi-
tive and negative effects. 
 It should, lastly, not be forgotten that in any possible confrontation 
between Parliament and Assembly or Council, MPs’ legal position remains 
weak. Though equipped with parliamentary immunity, they sit as representa-
tives of their respective national parliaments, can be recalled by them, and sit 
concurrently with these national bodies.  By contrast, the President and Vice-
Presidents, though their own terms also run concurrently with those of their 
respective national parliaments, are designated ‘Officers of the Pan-African Par-
liament’. Although not elucidated, this suggests some special status. Since they 
are responsible for the management and administration of parliamentary affairs 
                                                 
46 See Art. 22 Constitutive Act; EX/CL/Dec.21 (III); and Exp/Draft/ECOSOCC Stat-
utes/Rev.2, 14 May 2003, esp. art. 3.6. Also see Meyns (2001): 62-63; Schoeman (2003): 13-14; 
and Sturman & Cilliers (2003). 
47 Unless otherwise decided. Art. 14.4 Protocol. 
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and facilities, their de facto position may be more secure. Moreover, possible 
disputes over interpretation of the Protocol will not be settled by the Assembly, 
but by the Court of Justice to be established under the Constitutive Act.48 This 
gives the Parliament some protection against interference from the Union’s inter-
governmental institutions.49 However, it would probably be best for the Parlia-
ment to avoid any head-on collision with the inter-governmental organs, cer-
tainly as long as MPs are not directly elected and cannot thereby derive benefit 
from a firmer representative mandate, which would strengthen their position in 
relation to member governments. 
 
3. It stands to reason that the nature of the Parliament’s composition also has a 
bearing on its potential effect on the member states,and hence on its impacts 
beyond the structures of the Union itself.  Generally, the quality and expertise of 
national parliamentarians indirectly come into play here. The fact that the na-
tional delegations sitting in the Pan-African Parliament must reflect the diversity 
of political opinions of their home assemblies is crucial, but it precludes any 
general assessment of the MPs’ potential roles. Those who are members of gov-
ernment parties will be more likely to be supportive of member states’ behaviour 
(as has been shown to be the case of the European Parliament), while MPs who 
at home sit on the opposition benches are more likely to criticise it. The unlikely 
event of direct elections could somewhat modify this distinction. 
 Here it should be noted that the Parliament’s potential impact on mem-
ber states could, more generally, be enhanced if it were to be involved in the 
implementation of the CSSDCA initiative or in NEPAD’s action plans. A role for 
the Parliament in these processes is, however, not a foregone conclusion. Thus, 
in 2002 a special heads of state conference (and not the AU Assembly) endorsed 
a memorandum in which member states committed themselves to CSSDCA 
biennial review meetings at the level of government leaders, diplomats and sen-
ior officials, supported by visitation panels composed of eminent personalities. 
No role was foreseen for members of the Pan-African Parliament.50 This contra-
vened decisions taken earlier by the OAU Assembly, which in July 2000 resolved 
that the biennial review should make provision for the Pan-African MPs.51 
                                                 
48 The protocol for this court was adopted in 2003. Assembly/Dec.25 (II). As of 11 March 
2004, 28 countries had signed, but none had ratified it. List of Countries Which Have Signed, 
Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on the Protocol of the African Court of 
Justice of the African Union. 
49 However, pending the Court’s creation, the Assembly shall settle such disputes by a two-
thirds majority. Art. 20 Protocol. 
50 Although the memorandum did cater for inputs by national parliamentarians and ‘civil 
society’. Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Coopera-
tion Africa, 8-9 July, Durban, South Africa, ch. V. 
51 AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI), paragraph 15. 
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Things were complicated further by the introduction of the rival NEPAD pro-
gramme, which also provided for review processes. While this is not the place to 
go into the NEPAD programme as a whole,52 suffice it to say that in 2002 the AU 
Assembly approved the NEPAD sectoral programme entitled ‘Peace, Security, 
Democracy and Political Governance Initiative’. Its implementation was dele-
gated to a committee of heads of state and government. The latter supervised the 
establishment of a voluntary ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’, which entails a 
peer review every three years. By February 2004 procedures for the NEPAD 
review mechanism had been agreed, and sixteen countries had signed up to it, 
with on-the-spot visits to take place a month later in Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya and 
Mauritius.53 
 Since these review processes provide for similar measures, but work 
with different periods, there is some need for harmonisation in order to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. As the peer reviews under the NEPAD initiative seem 
actually to come off the ground, such rationalisation would be in the Parlia-
ment’s interest, provided this included the role stipulated for the Parliament 
under the CSSDCA process. There might, in this respect, be possibilities for tacti-
cal alliances with certain member states and with the AU Commission. The two 
review initiatives have attracted varying degrees of support, with some member 
states providing solid backing, others being sceptical or hostile, and again others, 
like Nigeria and South Africa, regarding them to some extent as rival projects.54 
In this context, the Parliament could try and win support for itself, among others 
from the AU Commission. The Commission could be its natural institutional 
ally, as it was itself sidetracked, at least temporarily, in the implementation of the 
NEPAD programmes.55 
Yet, contrary to remarks made by the Commission,56 a Parliamentary 
role in this process is not self-evident. Peer reviews are to a certain extent based 
on the concept of voluntary monitoring by colleagues – i.e. monitoring in the 
                                                 
52 See, for example, Olukoshi (2002); Hansen & Johanssen (2003); and Gelb (2001). 
53 Assembly/AU/Decl.8; Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security 
Policy, Sirte, 28 February 2003, (NEPAD paragraph); ‘NEPAD – Peer Review Mechanism’, in 
Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 10 February 2004; and ‘Peer Review Moving Forward, 
Says Nepad Secretariat Chief’ (www.nepad.org/en.html, accessed 15 March 2004). 
54 Schoeman (2003): 3; editorial in African Security Review, 11 (2002), 4: 1-3; and Africa Re-
search Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series) (2003): 15367. 
55 These are serviced by separate institutions based in South Africa. Report of the Secretary-
General on the Implementation of the CSSDCA, 28 June-6 July 2002, chs. II & V-VI; 
EX/CL/Dec.59 (III); and Assembly/AU/Decl.8.  See also Adisa (2002). 
56 AU spokesman to the UN IRIN network (www.allAfrica.com, accessed 19 November 
2003). 
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inter- or post-governmental sphere57 – and on the idea of gradually building up a 
new political culture through confidence-building and positive, non-adversarial 
exchanges. In such a process, the argumentative fashions of a parliamentary 
gathering could do more harm than good, especially in the delicate early stages. 
It will be difficult for the Parliament to gain a voice in this context, especially in 
NEPAD’s ‘Panel of Eminent Persons’, since these are supposed to be independ-
ent and not meant to represent any organisation.58 Much depends on the Parlia-
ment’s ability to air criticism or conduct ‘opposition’ in a way that would differ 
from some of the practices of multi-party politics known from African states. 
 Yet, in order for the above review processes to contribute to Africa’s 
changing continental order, political leaders must be prepared to face criticism, 
especially from outside government circles. Times are changing, to some extent 
to the advantage of institutions like the Pan-African Parliament. Thus, in 2002 
the AU adopted a ‘Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections 
in Africa’, which has been elaborated further in a draft ‘African Charter on Elec-
tions, Democracy and Governance’.59 Like other AU declarations, treaties and 
documents, it strongly emphasises the need for and pledges commitment to a 
democratic culture in Africa’s states, which, by logical extension or in the long 
run, could also be argued to be applicable inside the African Union. The Pan-
African Parliament could reinforce its potential impact on member states, finally, 
by collaborating – as it is allowed to do60 – with parliamentary organs of Africa’s 
regional economic groupings, such as the SADC Parliamentary Forum. 
 
 
Concluding observations 
 
The road ahead for the Pan-African Parliament will be long, but not without 
opportunities. Its different potential impacts will, however, not be more than 
marginal, certainly as long as it is not elected directly. Whether or not the Par-
liament will be given a new boost at the end of its first term, will largely depend 
on how it exploits its limited opportunities and navigates the waters of shifting 
continental politics. Even if some African governments now have a new stake in 
democratic political culture,61 doubts remain whether a decade of formal political 
                                                 
57 For a discussion of NEPAD’s peer review process and non-governmental actors, see Gelb 
(2001): 37. 
58 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2002. At present this panel mainly 
comprises academics. Vanguard  (Lagos), 12 March 2004 (accessed through 
www.allAfrica.com, 15 March 2004). 
59 Version 1.1 (February 2003). Also see Doc.EX/CL/35 (III) and Assembly/AU/Dec.18 (II). 
60 Genge (2000): 10. See art.  18 Protocol. SADC stands for ‘Southern African Development 
Community’. 
61 One could think here of countries like Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. 
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pluralism has made this true for all, or even the majority of, governments. In this 
context, more member states might wish to modify their political calculations if 
the Parliament were to be elected directly. 
 In terms of social interests, however, a natural opposition between the 
Parliament and the AU’s inter-governmental organs is much less obvious. Critics 
have pointed out that the whole process of introducing the African Union and its 
Parliament was very much a ‘top down’ affair, in which governmental interests 
were firmly in the driver’s seat.62 Members of Africa’s national assemblies – and 
by extension of the Pan-African Parliament – are themselves part of societal 
elites. In the case of national parliamentarians, who depend financially on the 
state’s coffers, one may even question whether they themselves are not essen-
tially part of étatiste interests.  While in terms of social status African MPs do not 
fundamentally differ from their counterparts in the West, social distances in 
Africa are significantly larger. This makes it harder to link genuinely grass-roots 
interests to elite representatives operating at the level of the central state. 
 This is even more relevant in the case of parliamentarians agitating at 
the continental apex. With corruption rampant at national levels and lacking 
concrete powers, the Parliament’s daily operations could open the way to the 
milking of expense allowances that, in national settings, would be considered 
desirable perks. In partly copying European Union practice, it could risk falling 
into the same pitfalls that earned the European Parliament its unsavoury reputa-
tion (in its case even 25 years after its first direct elections). Alternatively, if, like 
its European counterpart, the Pan-African Parliament could fulfil the unspecified 
function of safety net for marginalised politicians, it could help improve the 
quality of political life in member states – albeit incongruously. As in the case of 
other continental institutions, in the end its future depends on the state of Af-
rica’s national political orders. 
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Zusammenfassung  
 
Der Artikel untersucht die Bedeutung des vor kurzem errichteten „Panafrikanischen 
Parlaments“. Das Parlament ist eine der wenigen wirklichen Neuerungen der „Afri-
kanischen Union/African Union“ (AU) – ihrerseits eine Nachfolge-Organisation der 
„Organisation afrikanischer Einheit/Organisation of African Unity“ (OAU) -, und als 
solche könnte es den institutionellen Veränderungen, welche sich in der Kontinental-
politik vollzogen haben, eine entschiedenere Bedeutung verleihen. Der Artikel skiz-
ziert die Vorgeschichte von Ansätzen zu parlamentarischer Vertretung im Rahmen 
der (O)AU, stellt dann den Gründungsverlauf der Afrikanischen Union/African 
Union dar und setzt diesen in Bezug zu der Vorstellung einer parlamentarischen 
Versammlung. Es folgt eine eingehende Erläuterung des parlamentarischen Proto-
kolls und der Organe und Befugnisse, mit denen das Parlament ausgestattet ist sowie 
seiner amtlichen Beziehungen zu anderen Körperschaften der Union. Die amtliche 
Eröffnung des Parlaments im März 2004 wird dargestellt, gefolgt von einer Prognose 
seiner Auswirkungen auf die Einrichtungen der AU; auf die politische Willensbil-
dung innerhalb der AU; als auch auf die Mitgliedstaaten der AU. Anschließend wird 
erörtert, welche Rolle das Parlament eventuell in den Überprüfungsverfahren von 
CSSDCA und NEPAD spielen könnte. Der Artikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass das 
Parlament bis auf weiteres von eher untergeordneter Bedeutung sein wird.  
Schlüsselwörter  
 
Afrikanische Union, Parlament, Parlamentarische Funktionen, Parlamentsstruktur, In-
ternationale staatliche Organisation, Reform 
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Résumé 
 
L’article analyse l’importance du « Parlement panafricain » récemment mis en place. 
Celui-ci est l’une des rares vraies nouveautés de l’ « Union Africaine » (UA), 
l’organisation succédant à l’ « Organisation de l’Unité Africaine » (OUA). En tant que 
tel, il pourrait conférer une importance plus décisive aux changements institutionnels 
qui ont été effectués dans la politique continentale. Cet article retrace l’histoire des 
prémisses d’une représentation parlementaire dans le cadre de l’OUA et de l’UA, 
décrit le processus de création de l’UA et le met en relation avec la notion 
d’assemblée parlementaire. Puis s’en suit une explication détaillée du protocole par-
lementaire, des organes et compétences du Parlement et de ses relations officielles 
avec les autres organes de l’UA. L’article analyse par la suite l’ouverture officielle du 
Parlement en mars 2004 et avance un prognostic de son impact sur les structures de 
l’UA, sur la formation d’une volonté politique au sein de l’UA ainsi que sur les Etats 
membres de l’UA. Enfin, l’auteur examine le rôle que le Parlement pourrait éventuel-
lement jouer dans le processus de contrôle du CSSDCA et du NEPAD. L’auteur ar-
rive à la conclusion que, jusqu’à nouvel ordre, le Parlement aura une importance 
plutôt secondaire. 
 
Mots clés 
 
L’union africaine, parlement, fonctions du parlement, structure du parlement, prganisation 
gouvernemental internationale, réforme  
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